During the early days of October, the weather stayed firmly on the side of the Germans. The heavy rainfall had turned the ground at the foot of the Vosges into swamp land, and the American armor spearheading the Seventh Army’s renewed drive towards the high ground quickly became bogged down.[1]

This gave the Germans vital extra days in which to reorganize themselves and strengthen their main defensive line, which ran from the swamps to the High Vosges and which was at least 2-3 miles deep.

To the enemy rear, massive rail and road movements of troops and equipment went on unhindered beneath the banket of rain and fog which kept the Allied tactical air forces on the ground.[2]

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The fighting during the month of October was comparable to jungle fighting, where . . . maintenance of direction was most difficult because of the dense forests.

This alone resulted in many erroneous reports as to locations of units and enemy positions.

Difficulties arose as orders based on the best available information, which was frequently inaccurate, miscarried, and at times resulted in bitter and unexpected fighting . . . [and he advised that] all commanders must report actual conditions carefully, avoiding all possibility of errors in locations of units and omitting entirely reports based on optimism rather than fact.

Forest areas must be mopped up thoroughly. Small, well-dug-in enemy detachments if not mopped up will harass supply columns, and present difficult problems of liquidation because of our inability to use our supporting weapons inside our lines.

 Sometimes the enemy deliberately lets us get as close as seventy-five or one hundred yards to him before disclosing his presence with fire, and on occasion lets the leading elements pass by.

This reduced the fight to a small arms fight with the enemy enjoying the advantage of good cover.

Holding the top of a hill or even what is ordinarily termed the military crest of a wooded hill does not necessarily give us control of the surrounding terrain.

We must require all units engaged in capturing a hill covered with forests to continue down the forward slopes until the open country is under small arms fire and artillery observation.[3]

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[1] I’ve lost the citation. Possibly Clark, 295.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Extracted from “Conclusions of Regimental Commander,” 36th Inf Div AAR Oct 44, p. 2. Quoted in: Clarke, 295.

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