The attack on Bruyères began on the morning of 15 October 1944 in a cold drizzle with considerable ground fog.[1]

The weather was both a blessing and a curse for the American attackers, because it obscured the initial American advance from German observation but at the same time, In order to launch their attack at 0800, the infantrymen had to be up and awake in the forty-degree Fahrenheit downpour at 0645, well before dawn. Morale was adversely affected; at times like that, the cohesion born of long association and training together was critical.[2]

The defenders did not share this common cohesive background. Their commander, Generalleutnant Häckel, wrote after the battle that because they hardly knew one another, his commanders and men “often cracked soon after their commitment.”[3]

In this critical battle, the American superiority in this regard would combine with the aggressive and intelligent maneuvering to produce an important victory.[4]

Bruyères is a typical Vosges village in that it lies in a small valley dominated by several major hills. Its characteristically Alsatian stone and masonry structures make ideal defensive positions. Any house can be turned into a pillbox, practically impervious to small-arms fire, within a few hours, let alone the two weeks the Americans’ logistical problems had afforded the defenders.[5]

Initially, for American infantry battalions assaulted three reinforced battalions of dug-in German infantry. Over mountainous or hilly terrain, machine guns would dominate, and the match up in machine guns was close.[6]

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Of course, the Germans could also depend on familiarity with the terrain over which they have had several days, if not weeks, to prepare their defenses. Hundreds of anti-personnel and antitank mines have been skillfully laid along the southern approach to Bruyères. Houses and other buildings have been selected to serve both as pillboxes and observation posts, in fields of fire had been carefully selected and cleared.[7]

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The defenders’ strength in machine guns and mortars became apparent during this fight as the stone and masonry structure along each road were skillfully defended. Each time ground was lost to the advancing Americans, an artillery or mortar-supported counter attack was mounted as quickly as possible to recover the yield territory.[8]

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Chester Tanaka, a member of the 442d RCT, pointed out that the attacking Americans “did not know then that this was the beginning of a far different kind of fight then the one waged in Italy. Here, the battleground was close to the German border. In Italy, the Germans could afford to trade real estate for time, men, and material. In the Bruyères sector, their fortifications were deeper and more extensive, their firepower heavier and more intense, and their troops grimmer and more determined.”[9]

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[1] VI Corps G2 Periodic Report, 15 October 1944. From: Bonn, When the Odds Were Even, 94.

[2] Bonn, When the Odds Were Even, 94.

[3] Ernst Häckel, “The 16^th Infantry Division, Part II: The Campaign in the Rhineland.” MS. B-452, USAREUR Series, 1947, 11. Quoted in: Bonn, When the Odds Were Even, 94.

[4] Bonn, When the Odds Were Even, 94.

[5] Bonn, When the Odds Were Even, 89.

[6] Bonn, When the Odds Were Even, 93.

[7] Seventh Army, Report of Operations, 364. From: Bonn, When the Odds Were Even, 93.

[8] Bonn, When the Odds Were Even, 93.

[9] Chester Tanka, Go For Broke, 75-76. (Go For Broke, Inc., Richmond, CA. 1982). Quoted in: Bonn, When the Odds Were Even, 94-95.

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